skills/fengjiehzi/skills/search-first/Gen Agent Trust Hub

search-first

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant attack surface by instructing the agent to ingest and act upon data from external, untrusted sources including npm, PyPI, GitHub, and the general web.
  • Ingestion points: The workflow explicitly uses a 'general-purpose' subagent to search external registries and the web for code patterns and tools.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions are provided to the agent to treat search results as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within retrieved documentation or README files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides a framework for the agent to perform npm install, pip install, and execute shell commands (rg) based on the research findings.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or verification steps are required for the external content before it influences the agent's next steps.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages the dynamic discovery and installation of external software packages (e.g., npm install textlint-rule-no-dead-link, ajv-cli) without requiring a verification of the source's integrity or security posture beyond basic metrics like 'maintenance' and 'community'.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The instructions direct the agent to access potentially sensitive local configuration files, specifically ~/.claude/settings.json, to inspect the current environment's capabilities. These files may contain API keys, tool configurations, or other sensitive metadata.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 02:18 AM