tencent-survey
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile describes a workflow where thecheck_skill_updatetool returns a JSON object containing aninstructionfield. The skill directs the agent to "follow the instruction command to update" (遵循 instruction 指令进行更新). This pattern involves executing dynamically generated strings from a remote server, which is a significant security risk if the agent automates the process without user validation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
setup.shscript executes several shell commands to manage the environment, including installing global Node.js packages (npm install -g mcporter) and modifying tool configurations. It also generates and stores authentication tokens in the user's temporary directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from survey participants via the
list_answerstool. - Ingestion points: The
list_answerstool (inreferences/list_answers.md) andget_surveytool (inreferences/get_survey.md) ingest user-submitted responses and survey content. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in survey data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute CLI commands via
mcporterand run thesetup.shscript. - Sanitization: The documentation for
get_surveynotes that titles may contain HTML tags requiring cleaning, but there is no broader strategy for sanitizing instructions embedded in text fields. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on the external
mcporterCLI tool and interacts with API endpoints atwj.qq.com(Tencent Survey). While these are established services, they represent external dependencies required for the skill's functionality.
Audit Metadata