guided-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external pull requests, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker could embed malicious instructions in PR metadata or code comments. * Ingestion points: The skill reads pull request titles, bodies, and diff contents using
gh pr viewandgh pr diff(SKILL.md, Phase 1). * Boundary markers: The instructions direct the agent to show hunks verbatim withindiffcode blocks (SKILL.md, Phase 3), which provides structural delimitation. * Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands (gh,git,awk), file system access (<scratchpad>/pr.diff), and code editing capabilities (SKILL.md, Phase 1 and Phase 3). * Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization or validation of the ingested PR content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to process data, including an
awkpattern that interpolates path fragments. * Evidence: The workflow usesawk '/^diff --git/{p=($0 ~ /<path-fragment>/)} p' pr.diffto extract specific file diffs from a saved file (SKILL.md, Phase 1).
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