cursor-cli

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes the agent command-line utility using the node:child_process.spawn function to run the Cursor sub-agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Allows for the executable path to be overridden via the CURSOR_CLI_EXECUTABLE environment variable, enabling the use of alternative or local versions of the tool.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automatically includes the --trust and --approve-mcps flags when calling the CLI. These flags disable the underlying tool's built-in security confirmation prompts, which allows the delegated agent to execute shell commands and modify files without requiring user intervention.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The wrapPrompt function in scripts/lib/schema.mjs prepends specific instructions to the user's prompt to force a JSON response format, which overrides the sub-agent's standard conversational behavior.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches installation scripts from Cursor's official domain (cursor.com) as part of the setup process described in the documentation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting external content and passing it to a sub-agent with significant capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: Input prompts are received via CLI arguments, the --prompt-file flag, or standard input (stdin).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety warnings are added to isolate the user-provided content within the prompt.
  • Capability inventory: The sub-agent has the capability to perform file system operations and execute shell commands, particularly when the --force flag is enabled.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization or validation on the input strings before they are interpolated into the prompt for the sub-agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 03:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cursor-cli