cursor-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes the
agentcommand-line utility using thenode:child_process.spawnfunction to run the Cursor sub-agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Allows for the executable path to be overridden via the
CURSOR_CLI_EXECUTABLEenvironment variable, enabling the use of alternative or local versions of the tool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automatically includes the
--trustand--approve-mcpsflags when calling the CLI. These flags disable the underlying tool's built-in security confirmation prompts, which allows the delegated agent to execute shell commands and modify files without requiring user intervention. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
wrapPromptfunction inscripts/lib/schema.mjsprepends specific instructions to the user's prompt to force a JSON response format, which overrides the sub-agent's standard conversational behavior. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches installation scripts from Cursor's official domain (
cursor.com) as part of the setup process described in the documentation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting external content and passing it to a sub-agent with significant capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Input prompts are received via CLI arguments, the
--prompt-fileflag, or standard input (stdin). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety warnings are added to isolate the user-provided content within the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The sub-agent has the capability to perform file system operations and execute shell commands, particularly when the
--forceflag is enabled. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization or validation on the input strings before they are interpolated into the prompt for the sub-agent.
Audit Metadata