change-review-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute the
harnesscommand-line utility, including searching for it in local directories and repo checkouts. - Evidence: The skill instructs the agent to run:
harness run change-review --workspace /path/to/repo --base main --head HEAD --handoff-stdin --verbose. - Evidence: Documentation in
SKILL.mdmentions running roles throughharness,.harness/bin/harness, or a source checkout executable. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface as it ingests and triages data from external, potentially untrusted sources produced during the review workflow.
- Ingestion points: The agent is directed to read
meta.json,summary.md,events.jsonl, and 'every completed reviewer JSON' as part of the triage process inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to separate the content of these artifacts from the agent's internal instructions, nor are there warnings to ignore embedded directives.
- Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent the ability to execute shell commands (
harness) and modify the local codebase based on the triaged information. - Sanitization: The process does not specify any validation or sanitization of the artifact content before it is used by the agent to determine implementation dispositions (e.g., 'Implement', 'Adapt').
Audit Metadata