change-review-workflow

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute the harness command-line utility, including searching for it in local directories and repo checkouts.
  • Evidence: The skill instructs the agent to run: harness run change-review --workspace /path/to/repo --base main --head HEAD --handoff-stdin --verbose.
  • Evidence: Documentation in SKILL.md mentions running roles through harness, .harness/bin/harness, or a source checkout executable.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface as it ingests and triages data from external, potentially untrusted sources produced during the review workflow.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is directed to read meta.json, summary.md, events.jsonl, and 'every completed reviewer JSON' as part of the triage process in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to separate the content of these artifacts from the agent's internal instructions, nor are there warnings to ignore embedded directives.
  • Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent the ability to execute shell commands (harness) and modify the local codebase based on the triaged information.
  • Sanitization: The process does not specify any validation or sanitization of the artifact content before it is used by the agent to determine implementation dispositions (e.g., 'Implement', 'Adapt').
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 13, 2026, 01:59 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — change-review-workflow