llm-council
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to invoke external CLI binaries, specifically
codexandagy(Antigravity), using shell commands with arguments that include repository directories and prompts. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The registry for Antigravity (a Google-provided tool) in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to use the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This flag is used to bypass internal security and permission checks within the tool's harness. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a tool resolution logic where it determines which CLI tool to run based on a tier and allows for the substitution of other external CLI coding agents at runtime if a tool is unavailable.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests repository content from PRs and branches and passes it to external AI agents, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: PR and branch artifacts processed during the review flow as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary instructions are used to separate untrusted repository code from the instructions passed to the external CLI tools.
- Capability inventory: The skill invokes powerful CLI agents (
codex,agy) with broad read access to the local repository filesystem. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or content validation is performed on the ingested data before it is processed by the external agents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata