skills/ffroliva/gflow-cli/llm-council/Gen Agent Trust Hub

llm-council

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to invoke external CLI binaries, specifically codex and agy (Antigravity), using shell commands with arguments that include repository directories and prompts.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The registry for Antigravity (a Google-provided tool) in SKILL.md instructs the agent to use the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag. This flag is used to bypass internal security and permission checks within the tool's harness.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a tool resolution logic where it determines which CLI tool to run based on a tier and allows for the substitution of other external CLI coding agents at runtime if a tool is unavailable.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests repository content from PRs and branches and passes it to external AI agents, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: PR and branch artifacts processed during the review flow as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary instructions are used to separate untrusted repository code from the instructions passed to the external CLI tools.
  • Capability inventory: The skill invokes powerful CLI agents (codex, agy) with broad read access to the local repository filesystem.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or content validation is performed on the ingested data before it is processed by the external agents.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 08:25 AM