figma-generate-library

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from local codebase files to influence Figma asset generation.\n
  • Ingestion points: discovery-phase.md specifies the ingestion of various codebase files, including CSS, JSON, and JavaScript/TypeScript configuration files (e.g., tailwind.config.js, *.tokens.json).\n
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within these source files.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the use_figma tool to perform significant mutations on Figma documents, such as creating pages, variables, and component sets.\n
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or validation of the extracted content before using it to generate tool parameters.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill assembles JavaScript code at runtime to be executed within the Figma plugin environment via the use_figma tool.\n
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and various references provide instructions for embedding helper scripts from the scripts/ directory into tool calls. This is assessed as low severity because the scripts are included within the skill package and facilitate its primary intended function.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 11:44 AM