github-pr-workflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill attempts to automatically retrieve authentication tokens by searching sensitive local files. It includes instructions to read
~/.hermes/.envand uses regex patterns to extract plaintext credentials from the~/.git-credentialsfile. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to read and interpret CI failure logs from external sources to 'auto-fix' code, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Failure logs are read using the GitHub CLI or downloaded as zip archives from
api.github.com(documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/ci-troubleshooting.md). - Boundary markers: No delimiters are specified to isolate external log content from the agent's primary instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent uses file-modification tools (
patch,write_file) and version control commands (git commit,git push) to apply changes based on its interpretation of these logs. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of log content validation or sanitization before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on shell command execution for its primary logic, including the use of
python3 -cto parse API responses andunzipto process downloaded log data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches CI logs and workflow data from GitHub's official API (
api.github.com).
Audit Metadata