github-pr-workflow

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill attempts to automatically retrieve authentication tokens by searching sensitive local files. It includes instructions to read ~/.hermes/.env and uses regex patterns to extract plaintext credentials from the ~/.git-credentials file.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to read and interpret CI failure logs from external sources to 'auto-fix' code, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Failure logs are read using the GitHub CLI or downloaded as zip archives from api.github.com (documented in SKILL.md and references/ci-troubleshooting.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters are specified to isolate external log content from the agent's primary instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent uses file-modification tools (patch, write_file) and version control commands (git commit, git push) to apply changes based on its interpretation of these logs.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of log content validation or sanitization before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on shell command execution for its primary logic, including the use of python3 -c to parse API responses and unzip to process downloaded log data.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches CI logs and workflow data from GitHub's official API (api.github.com).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 19, 2026, 07:46 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — github-pr-workflow