atlas
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Nov 22, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
- Potential prompt injection detected (medium risk: 0.30). The skill is a legitimate state-machine orchestrator, but it silently appends
.atlas/to the user's.git/info/excludewithout asking or reporting that change in the OUTPUT summary, which alters the user's repository metadata beyond what the task needs.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (low risk: 0.10). The required workflow ingests third-party skill bodies from the extracted
skills/tree (ranked byskillselectand injected as the ACTIVE skill into the coder packet), which is a community-sourced package set the agent does not explicitly select, but the ranking is intent-driven and not forced delivery, so this is low rather than medium.
MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
- Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (low risk: 0.10). Operational change gate is met (it appends to the repo's
.git/info/exclude, creates git worktrees, and runs agit reset --hardrollback), but the irreversible-loss gate fails because the reset targets a sanctioned isolated worktree with committed green checkpoints and no unrecoverable loss of operational state is shown.
Issues (3)
E004
CRITICALPrompt injection detected in skill instructions.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
W013
MEDIUMAttempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
Audit Metadata