attribution-modeling
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: the skill includes a client-side utility for capturing marketing touchpoints that ingests untrusted input from the browser's location string without sanitization.\n
- Ingestion points: The
captureUTMTouchpointfunction inSKILL.mdreads parameters directly fromwindow.location.search(specificallyutm_source,utm_medium,utm_campaign,gclid, andfbclid).\n - Boundary markers: The implementation does not include any delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the captured data.\n
- Capability inventory: Touchpoints are stored in
localStorageand subsequently transmitted to a server-side endpoint during order creation (createOrder).\n - Sanitization: The code lacks validation or escaping for the string values extracted from the URL before they are stored and transmitted.\n
- Risk: An attacker could craft a URL containing malicious instructions in the UTM parameters. If these touchpoints are later retrieved and processed by an AI agent (e.g., for generating a marketing report), the agent may inadvertently follow the injected instructions.
Audit Metadata