predictive-personalization

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions define an architectural surface for ingesting untrusted behavioral data from end-users (e.g., product IDs, category IDs, and session events) to power recommendation engines. Maliciously crafted data from a website visitor could potentially influence the agent's behavior or output if it processes this data without sufficient sanitization or boundaries.\n
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (specifically the PersonalizationEvent interface and the updateUserProfile function).\n
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are provided in the architectural code snippets or implementation tasks.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill is intended for use by high-capability agent platforms (e.g., claude-code, cursor, gemini-cli) which have access to development tools and shell environments, increasing the potential impact if a malicious instruction is processed.\n
  • Sanitization: The provided architectural examples and tasks do not explicitly implement sanitization, validation, or escaping of the ingested product or category fields.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 11:01 AM