guidance
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides examples of a 'ReAct Agent' in both
SKILL.mdandreferences/examples.mdthat define a tool for calculations usinglambda expr: eval(expr). The input for this function is taken directly from the model's generated output (lm["action_input"]), which is controlled by the prompt and user-supplied data. This enables the execution of arbitrary Python code if the model is successfully tricked via prompt injection.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The usage ofeval()to process and execute strings at runtime is explicitly shown as a recommended pattern for extending the agent's capabilities in the documentation examples.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data, creating an attack surface for instructions embedded within that data to be executed by the model.\n - Ingestion points: Functions like
extract_entities(lm, text)andreact_agent(lm, question)process untrusted strings directly into the model's generation context.\n - Boundary markers: The code examples provided do not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to isolate untrusted data from the model's system instructions, which increases the risk of the model obeying commands hidden in the input.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill enables multi-step workflows and specifically demonstrates the use of high-risk capabilities like the
eval()-based calculator tool.\n - Sanitization: No input validation, escaping, or filtering of the external data is demonstrated in the provided usage patterns.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of well-known libraries such as
guidanceandtransformersfrom standard package registries.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata