llama-factory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests large volumes of documentation from the
references/directory to guide agent responses. While this content is derived from official sources, the lack of explicit boundary markers for external data is a structural characteristic of documentation skills. - Ingestion points: Reference files in
references/(e.g.,advanced.md,getting_started.md). - Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory: Command execution (pip, torchrun, llamafactory-cli), file system access (configuring JSON/YAML files), and network operations (downloading models from HuggingFace/ModelScope).
- Sanitization: Absent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation contains numerous examples of command-line operations for environment setup, model training (using
torchrunandaccelerate), and API deployment. These are standard procedures for machine learning development. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation guide for Linux mentions using
sudoto execute the CUDA uninstaller. This is documented as a necessary administrative step for managing system-level GPU drivers and does not indicate malicious intent.
Audit Metadata