miles-rl-training
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download a Docker image (
radixark/miles:latest) and clone a Git repository (https://github.com/radixark/miles.git) from an unverified user account. While the skill author is listed as Orchestra Research, the software originates from a different, unauthenticated namespace. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes the ability to load and execute arbitrary Python scripts via specific command-line arguments.
- Evidence:
references/api-reference.mdincludes flags--custom-generate-function-pathand--custom-rm-pathwhich allow the execution of user-specified local scripts during the training process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest external data for reinforcement learning training, creating a potential surface for instructions embedded in the data to influence the agent or the resulting model.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Workflow 1 and 2) references the ingestion of JSONL files via the--prompt-dataflag. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to isolate the training content from the framework's operational logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes a training framework (
train.py) with capabilities including file system access for checkpoints and high-privilege hardware access (GPU IPC/shared memory). - Sanitization: There is no mention of validation, filtering, or sanitization of the training prompts before they are processed by the framework.
Audit Metadata