sglang
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches dependencies and source code from external repositories and specialized indices.
- Evidence: Installation commands include
git clone https://github.com/sgl-project/sglang.gitandpip install sglang[all] flashinfer -i https://flashinfer.ai/whl/cu121/torch2.4/inSKILL.mdandreferences/deployment.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides numerous patterns for ingesting untrusted data into LLM context, which represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is interpolated into prompts via variables like
user_query,text,article,description, andnatural_languageacrossSKILL.mdandreferences/structured-generation.md. - Boundary markers: The examples utilize basic text prefixes such as 'User:', 'Assistant:', or 'Article:' which are insufficient to prevent sophisticated injection attacks.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables LLM generation, tool call execution (e.g., in the
agent_workflow), and structured output generation (JSON, Regex, EBNF Grammars). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or schema validation for the raw input data is demonstrated before it is interpolated into the prompts.
Audit Metadata