gh-address-comments
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python script
scripts/fetch_comments.pyexecutes the GitHub CLI (gh) viasubprocess.runto interact with the GitHub GraphQL API and retrieve pull request information. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly request the platform to usesandbox_permissions=require_escalatedand elevated network access to enable theghtool to function, which constitutes a request for higher execution privileges. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources (GitHub PR comments).
- Ingestion points: Pull request comments, review bodies, and review thread content are fetched by
scripts/fetch_comments.pyand provided to the agent. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define clear delimiters or use instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched GitHub data.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute local scripts and is tasked with applying fixes to the codebase based on the fetched comments, granting it write access to the repository.
- Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization is performed on the comment text before it is presented to the agent for action.
Audit Metadata