yeet
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow in
SKILL.mdexplicitly instructs the agent to "run pr-body.md". This temporary file is intended to hold the PR description, which is constructed from user-supplied descriptions and code deltas. Because the instruction tells the agent to execute this file, any shell commands embedded in the PR content would be run on the host system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]:
SKILL.mdcontains a directive to "install dependencies and rerun once" if automated checks fail. This gives the agent broad authority to install unverified software from external package managers, creating a significant remote code execution risk through dependency confusion or malicious package injection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a pattern of generating a script at runtime from user-controlled content and then executing it. This behavior is a common method for executing malicious payloads that are not present in the static files of the skill and allows for bypassing security controls.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it interpolates external data into a high-privilege execution flow.
- Ingestion points: The
{description}and{deltas}placeholders inSKILL.mdare used to populate the content of the temporary file. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to treat the file content as data only, which leads to the agent potentially executing instructions found within the PR description.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
git,gh(GitHub CLI), and direct shell execution via the "run" command inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: The skill provides no instructions for sanitizing or escaping the content before it is written to the file and executed.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata