firedrill-service-authoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
firedrillCLI tool to initialize, build, and interact with synthetic services. These commands (e.g.,firedrill tools publish,firedrill tools seed,firedrill tools invoke) are standard for the intended workflow. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is the authoring of TypeScript/JavaScript code (
service.ts) that is subsequently published and executed as a synthetic service on a remote host. The documentation notes that these handlers are executed in a restricted environment with limited capabilities (e.g., no filesystem, no network access, and isolated state). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of external data through
firedrill tools seedand service logic viafiredrill tools publish. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the authored content contains malicious instructions intended to influence the agent. - Ingestion points: Service manifest (
manifest.json), source code (service.ts), and dataset files (seed.json) in thereferences/authoring.mdfile. - Boundary markers: The documentation in
SKILL.mdandreferences/authoring.mdincludes clear warnings to use explicit upload lists and sanitized seed records, and to never upload live customer data. - Capability inventory: The agent can publish code for remote execution and invoke operations that interact with that code's state, as seen in
references/authoring.mdandreferences/services.md. - Sanitization: The skill instructions explicitly direct the user to remove customer secrets and sanitize records before upload, although no automated sanitization logic is provided within the skill instructions.
Audit Metadata