openstoryline-use
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires the user to provide multiple sensitive API keys (including keys for LLM, VLM, and various Text-to-Speech providers). These keys are written to the local
config.tomlfile to configure the video editing services. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The helper script
scripts/feishu_file_sender.pyaccesses the user's home directory to read~/.openclaw/openclaw.json, which contains sensitive application secrets (appIdandappSecret) used to authenticate with the Feishu platform. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user instructions via the
--promptargument and relays them to the backend OpenStoryline service without explicit sanitization. - Ingestion points: The
promptparameter in thescripts/bridge_openstoryline.pyscript. - Boundary markers: None identified; user input is passed directly into a JSON payload for websocket communication.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify local configuration files, perform network operations to external services (Feishu), and manage local service processes.
- Sanitization: No input validation or filtering is performed on the prompt before it is processed by the downstream agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates several shell-level operations, including starting local web services using
uvicorn, managing the OpenStoryline MCP server, and executing internal Python scripts to bridge communication and send files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation within
SKILL.mdinstructs the user to install therequestslibrary viapipto enable the file-sending functionality.
Audit Metadata