orchestrator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/spawn-agent.shexecutes shell commands usingevalon a command string that incorporates theTASK_CONTENTvariable. - Evidence:
eval "$CMD" > "$RESULT_FILE" 2>&1inscripts/spawn-agent.sh. - Details: Since
TASK_CONTENToriginates from user-provided task descriptions or external task files, an attacker can inject shell metacharacters (such as backticks or$()) to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the agent process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/parallel-run.shparses task definitions from YAML files using insecure string matching techniques withgrepandawk. - Evidence: Parsing logic in
parse_yaml_simpleandparse_yaml_tasksfunctions inscripts/parallel-run.sh. - Details: These parsing methods do not properly sanitize input, allowing an attacker to craft a YAML file where fields like
agent,task, orworkspacecontain malicious payloads that are eventually executed in a shell context. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill configuration and instructions mandate running sub-agents with auto-approval flags that bypass safety filters.
- Evidence: The use of
--yolofor Gemini,--dangerously-skip-permissionsfor Claude, and--full-autofor Codex as defined inconfig/cli-config.yamlandSKILL.md. - Details: By removing the human-in-the-loop requirement, the skill enables sub-agents to perform destructive file operations or system commands autonomously. This significantly increases the risk and impact of indirect prompt injection attacks where a sub-agent might be tricked by malicious data it processes.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The "Verification Gate" in the orchestration workflow executes a shell script using parameters derived from task data.
- Evidence:
bash .agent/skills/_shared/verify.sh {agent-type} {workspace}mentioned inSKILL.md. - Details: The
{agent-type}and{workspace}values are pulled from thetask-board.mdfile. If an attacker controls the task definitions, they can inject arbitrary commands into these parameters, which will be executed during the verification phase.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata