oma-search

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The resources/error-playbook.md file contains instructions for the agent to install the curl_cffi Python package using pip if the impersonation strategy fails. While this uses a well-known package registry, runtime dependency installation is a security concern.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external web sources and remote code repositories, presenting a risk of indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched from external URLs via oma search fetch and from GitHub/GitLab repositories using gh and glab commands, as described in resources/execution-protocol.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary markers or delimiters to separate untrusted external content from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including executing CLI tools (gh, glab, oma), spawning browser processes, and interacting with local code intelligence providers.
  • Sanitization: Although the skill normalizes and deduplicates results, it does not explicitly sanitize or filter the content for embedded malicious instructions.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The web retrieval process involves dynamic execution strategies, such as using puppeteer-core for browser-based fetching and spawning subprocesses via curl_cffi to impersonate different browsers.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill regularly spawns subprocesses to execute external CLI tools like gh (GitHub CLI), glab (GitLab CLI), and various oma search primitives, passing user-provided queries as arguments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 11, 2026, 04:38 AM