figma-to-unity
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external Figma URLs via the
get_design_contexttool inSKILL.md. Malicious text within a Figma design (e.g., in layer names) could attempt to influence the agent's output. Evidence: - Ingestion points:
get_design_context(fileKey, nodeId)inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent for raw Figma data.
- Capability inventory: File-write access for generating
.uxml,.uss, and.csfiles. - Sanitization: Instructions require the agent to interpret data as a design spec rather than direct code transliteration, providing some isolation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads image and SVG assets from URLs provided by the Figma MCP server into the local Unity project's
Assetsdirectory (documented in Step 5 ofSKILL.md). This includes instructions to uselocalhostsources when provided by the MCP bridge. These downloads are core to the asset migration workflow. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and writes C# scripts and UI configuration files to the local file system. While these are not executed by the agent itself, they constitute the creation of executable logic based on external design inputs.
Audit Metadata