imagegen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from users, such as image prompts, verbatim text to render, and constraints, and interpolates this content into strings passed to the
codex execcommand. - Ingestion points: User-supplied prompts and image metadata defined in the
Workflowsection ofSKILL.mdand theWrite the promptsection ofreferences/prompting.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses single quotes to wrap instructions within the
codex execcommand, but it lacks explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize or escape user-provided text that might contain shell control characters or quotes. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via
codex exec, run Python scripts withpython3 -c, and manage dependencies withpip install. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, filtering, or escaping is present in the provided instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands via the Codex CLI (
codex exec) and Python (python3 -c) for the purpose of generating, editing, and verifying images. - Evidence: Examples in
SKILL.mdshow the use ofcodex exec --sandbox workspace-writeto invoke image generation tools, andreferences/transparency.mdincludes apython3 -ccommand to verify alpha transparency in generated files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references external tools and libraries required for full functionality.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddirects the user to install the Codex CLI from an official OpenAI domain and suggests installing thepillowPython package for local image inspection viapython3 -m pip install pillow.
Audit Metadata