skills/firzus/agent-skills/imagegen/Gen Agent Trust Hub

imagegen

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from users, such as image prompts, verbatim text to render, and constraints, and interpolates this content into strings passed to the codex exec command.
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied prompts and image metadata defined in the Workflow section of SKILL.md and the Write the prompt section of references/prompting.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses single quotes to wrap instructions within the codex exec command, but it lacks explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize or escape user-provided text that might contain shell control characters or quotes.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via codex exec, run Python scripts with python3 -c, and manage dependencies with pip install.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, filtering, or escaping is present in the provided instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands via the Codex CLI (codex exec) and Python (python3 -c) for the purpose of generating, editing, and verifying images.
  • Evidence: Examples in SKILL.md show the use of codex exec --sandbox workspace-write to invoke image generation tools, and references/transparency.md includes a python3 -c command to verify alpha transparency in generated files.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references external tools and libraries required for full functionality.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md directs the user to install the Codex CLI from an official OpenAI domain and suggests installing the pillow Python package for local image inspection via python3 -m pip install pillow.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 12, 2026, 06:27 PM