skills/fishzjp/qa-skills/qa/Gen Agent Trust Hub

qa

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external inputs such as requirement documents and code repositories to build test models and strategies. This ingestion surface is vulnerable to instructions embedded within the data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads external "需求材料" (Requirement materials) and "代码仓库" (Code repositories) as listed in the '启动:意图识别与路由' section.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content or use delimiters when processing these files.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestration includes calling skills for automated-e2e-testing and api-testing, which execute shell scripts and code (SKILL.md, Stage 5).
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not describe any sanitization or validation of the text content extracted from project files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The pipeline facilitates the execution of local scripts and automated test suites, which could be exploited if malicious code is introduced into the project structure.
  • Evidence: Stage 5 ("执行") describes executing code or scripts from the playwright/ directory and API testing scripts.
  • Evidence: The '断点检查' (Breakpoints) section involves running a local Python script validate_schema.py to verify file integrity.
  • Context: These executions are gated by human-in-the-loop checkpoints (⏸), such as the execution strategy decision, which reduces the risk of unauthorized or harmful command execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 10, 2026, 01:36 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — qa