qa
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external inputs such as requirement documents and code repositories to build test models and strategies. This ingestion surface is vulnerable to instructions embedded within the data.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external "需求材料" (Requirement materials) and "代码仓库" (Code repositories) as listed in the '启动:意图识别与路由' section.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content or use delimiters when processing these files.
- Capability inventory: The orchestration includes calling skills for
automated-e2e-testingandapi-testing, which execute shell scripts and code (SKILL.md, Stage 5). - Sanitization: The instructions do not describe any sanitization or validation of the text content extracted from project files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The pipeline facilitates the execution of local scripts and automated test suites, which could be exploited if malicious code is introduced into the project structure.
- Evidence: Stage 5 ("执行") describes executing code or scripts from the
playwright/directory and API testing scripts. - Evidence: The '断点检查' (Breakpoints) section involves running a local Python script
validate_schema.pyto verify file integrity. - Context: These executions are gated by human-in-the-loop checkpoints (⏸), such as the execution strategy decision, which reduces the risk of unauthorized or harmful command execution.
Audit Metadata