fittings-bls-series
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent or user to download a remote JavaScript file (
call.mjs) fromhttps://fittings.sh/skill/call.mjsand execute it usingnode. This pattern allows the remote server to control the code running in the local environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches resources from the
fittings.shdomain, including the execution client and metadata from the catalog. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions include the use of
curlandnodeto interact with remote endpoints and run downloaded logic. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requests that the user provides a private key (
FITTINGS_PRIVATE_KEY) in an environment variable. While the skill claims this is for metered payments using the x402 protocol, providing a private key to a remotely fetched script is a high-risk practice. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested from
https://fittings.sh/v1/bls/seriesandhttps://fittings.sh/catalog/bls.series. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
curlfor network requests andnodefor script execution. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote API response is described before processing.
Audit Metadata