email-deliverability

CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.

• Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 1.00). These URLs include a direct link to an executable JavaScript script (https://fittings.sh/skill/call.mjs) that the documentation tells users to curl and run — downloading and executing remote scripts is a high-risk distribution vector for malware.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

• Third-party content exposure detected (medium risk: 0.30). In call.mjs, the required workflow takes user-provided free text as the email query parameter (e.g., /v1/email/deliverability?email=...) and sends it to https://fittings.sh where the service processes it, so outsider text can flow into an LLM-free-text field at runtime via the workflow inputs.

MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

• Direct money access detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly includes an on-chain crypto payment flow: the endpoint returns a 402 with a signed quote that the client must "sign an authorization", examples show setting FITTINGS_PRIVATE_KEY and running node call.mjs, and it references USDC on Base and evm tooling. That means an agent holding the private key can sign payment authorizations (causing real settlement via a facilitator). This is a specific crypto/wallet payment capability that grants direct financial execution authority.