insane-design-apply

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs strong persona lock-in instructions, commanding the agent to act as an 'expert designer' who must 'never hedge' and 'pick one BOLD direction'. It also uses meta-instructions ('This document is an execution instruction, not a reference') to override default behavioral logic.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves executing shell commands such as grep for validation, git restore for rollbacks, and a Python command check (python3 -c "import playwright") to detect dependencies.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from design briefs and project files.
  • Ingestion points: Reads external design.md files and project source code (HTML/CSS).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities and the ability to fork background subagents with dynamic prompts.
  • Sanitization: Absent. Content from the design brief (particularly §17 Agent Prompt) is used directly to guide code implementation, which could allow an attacker to inject malicious instructions into the agent's context.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a background task mechanism (Task(run_in_background=true)) to invoke a subagent with a dynamically generated prompt. While the intended use is verification, this pattern allows for the execution of complex instructions outside the main agent's immediate oversight.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 1, 2026, 10:48 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — insane-design-apply