insane-design-apply
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs strong persona lock-in instructions, commanding the agent to act as an 'expert designer' who must 'never hedge' and 'pick one BOLD direction'. It also uses meta-instructions ('This document is an execution instruction, not a reference') to override default behavioral logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves executing shell commands such as
grepfor validation,git restorefor rollbacks, and a Python command check (python3 -c "import playwright") to detect dependencies. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from design briefs and project files.
- Ingestion points: Reads external
design.mdfiles and project source code (HTML/CSS). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities and the ability to fork background subagents with dynamic prompts.
- Sanitization: Absent. Content from the design brief (particularly §17 Agent Prompt) is used directly to guide code implementation, which could allow an attacker to inject malicious instructions into the agent's context.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a background task mechanism (
Task(run_in_background=true)) to invoke a subagent with a dynamically generated prompt. While the intended use is verification, this pattern allows for the execution of complex instructions outside the main agent's immediate oversight.
Audit Metadata