agent-orchestration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an orchestration layer where a primary agent delegates tasks to sub-agents via the
cursor-agentCLI. This architecture grants sub-agents the ability to execute shell commands and modify files autonomously (using the--forceflag), creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the agents process untrusted data from the codebase or external inputs. - Ingestion points: The
cursor-worker-implementandcursor-worker-reviewsub-agent templates (found inassets/claude/skills/) ingest prompt instructions and task briefs generated by the orchestrating agent. - Boundary markers: The instructions recommend using "self-contained" briefs, but the skill does not implement strict technical delimiters or sanitization routines to isolate potentially malicious data within these briefs.
- Capability inventory: Sub-agents are configured to use the
cursor-agenttool, which possesses broad permissions for file system modification and shell command execution. - Sanitization: The architecture relies on the parent agent's reasoning and a separate "verifier" agent to detect anomalies, rather than using programmatic sanitization of the inputs passed to the CLI.
Audit Metadata