gpu-container-setup-flagos

SUSPICIOUS: the core purpose is legitimate and most capabilities fit GPU container setup, but the fallback chain is too permissive. Pulling and executing container images from web search or a third-party Harbor, then self-updating references based on those discoveries, creates a disproportionate supply-chain and indirect prompt-injection risk for an automation skill that launches privileged GPU containers.

This is a procedural container-image discovery guide, not executable malware. It contains no direct credential theft, data exfiltration, reverse shell, cryptomining, or destructive behavior. Its primary security concern is supply-chain trust: it pulls and executes images from multiple external registries, may accept web-discovered registries, uses mutable tags, and lacks digest/signature/provenance verification. The self-modification instruction increases configuration-integrity risk. Use authenticated trusted registries, immutable digests, signature verification, and manual review before adding discovered registries.