model-migrate-flagos
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests model implementation code from an external "upstream" repository which is subsequently executed within the local environment.
- Ingestion points: Code is cloned from the vLLM upstream repository (Step 2 in
references/procedure.md) into a temporary folder. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,python3, andssh, enabling it to run the migrated code during verification steps. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings are used when the agent processes the external code.
- Sanitization: While
scripts/validate_migration.pyperforms static analysis for imports and API compatibility, it does not sanitize the logical content of the migrated model files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated management of remote servers using SSH and Docker commands.
- Evidence: The
scripts/e2e_remote_serve.shscript executes commands on a remote host using SSH with the-o StrictHostKeyChecking=noflag, which bypasses host identity verification. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads source code from an external repository to facilitate the migration process.
- Evidence:
references/procedure.mdStep 2 instructs the agent to clone thevllm-project/vllmrepository from GitHub. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of code downloaded from external sources.
- Evidence:
scripts/serve.shuses the--trust-remote-codeflag when launching the vLLM server, allowing the execution of arbitrary code from HuggingFace model checkpoints. - Evidence: Migrated code from the upstream repository is directly executed during the import test in
references/procedure.mdStep 4.2.C.
Audit Metadata