model-migrate-flagos

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests model implementation code from an external "upstream" repository which is subsequently executed within the local environment.
  • Ingestion points: Code is cloned from the vLLM upstream repository (Step 2 in references/procedure.md) into a temporary folder.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash, python3, and ssh, enabling it to run the migrated code during verification steps.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings are used when the agent processes the external code.
  • Sanitization: While scripts/validate_migration.py performs static analysis for imports and API compatibility, it does not sanitize the logical content of the migrated model files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated management of remote servers using SSH and Docker commands.
  • Evidence: The scripts/e2e_remote_serve.sh script executes commands on a remote host using SSH with the -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no flag, which bypasses host identity verification.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads source code from an external repository to facilitate the migration process.
  • Evidence: references/procedure.md Step 2 instructs the agent to clone the vllm-project/vllm repository from GitHub.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of code downloaded from external sources.
  • Evidence: scripts/serve.sh uses the --trust-remote-code flag when launching the vLLM server, allowing the execution of arbitrary code from HuggingFace model checkpoints.
  • Evidence: Migrated code from the upstream repository is directly executed during the import test in references/procedure.md Step 4.2.C.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 08:43 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — model-migrate-flagos