vllm-plugin-fl-setup-flagos
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs software components from external sources.
- It clones source code for
vllm-plugin-FL,FlagGems, andFlagCXfrom the vendor's GitHub organization (flagos-ai). - It references the official
vllm-project/vllmrepository for version 0.13.0. - It installs the
flagtreepackage from a vendor-specific PyPI index athttps://resource.flagos.net/repository/flagos-pypi-hosted/simple. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands for system discovery and software installation.
- Hardware detection is performed using tools such as
nvidia-smi,npu-smi info,mthreads-gmi, andixsmi. - Installation steps include directory management (
mkdir -p), repository cloning (git clone), and Python package installation (pip install). - It performs a broad filesystem search using
find / -maxdepth 5 -type d -name "<user_provided_model_name>"to locate model directories. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a process that ingests untrusted user input into sensitive shell commands, creating a vulnerability surface.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md, the agent is instructed to ask the user for a model name, which is then used as a parameter in afindcommand and a Python script. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to sanitize or escape the user's input before it is interpolated into the shell command.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution for filesystem searching, environment configuration, and repository management.
- Sanitization: No evidence of validation or sanitization logic is present to prevent a malicious user from providing a string that alters the intended shell command logic (e.g., command injection via backticks or subshells).
Audit Metadata