browser-qa
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs several automated and suggested shell operations, including environment detection via
node detect-env.mjs, package management withnpm install, and test suite execution usingnpx playwright test. It also provides instructions for manually cloning and running thebrowser-harnessCLI. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill suggests cloning the
browser-harnessrepository from a third-party GitHub account (browser-use/browser-harness). While it advises seeking user consent, this introduces code from an unverified source into the local environment. It also fetches standard dependencies and MCP servers from public registries. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: During 'Layer 1' and 'Layer 2', the skill generates Playwright TypeScript code based on user requirements and executes it. Running dynamically generated code that interacts with the browser and file system presents a risk if the generation logic is manipulated.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Layer 2' workflow (AI Autonomous Acceptance) involves the agent navigating to and analyzing untrusted external websites. This exposes the agent to indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in a web page's DOM, text, or metadata could attempt to hijack the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Processes external content via
browser_snapshotandbrowser_take_screenshottools. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or markers to distinguish between legitimate website data and potential malicious instructions during analysis.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities for file system access, shell execution, and network operations, which could be abused if an injection is successful.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or content filtering for the data retrieved from external URLs.
Audit Metadata