bib-parse
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from user-provided PDF documents to extract bibliographic information, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. Maliciously crafted text in a PDF's reference list could attempt to influence the agent's logic during parsing or metadata enrichment phases. \n
- Ingestion points: The
split-pdftool is used to read user-provided PDF files in Phase 1.1.\n - Boundary markers: The skill includes a mandatory manual confirmation step in Phase 1.2, where the user must verify the parsed reference skeleton before enrichment proceeds.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash(uv*),WebSearch,WebFetch, and file writing capabilities.\n - Sanitization: Outputs are validated via the
bib-validateskill in Phase 4.2 and a local verification script in Phase 4.3.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extracted metadata from the PDF, such as titles and DOIs, is passed as arguments to CLI tools. In Phase 2.2, titles are interpolated into commands likescholarly scholarly-search "<title>". While the use of quotes provides some protection, there is an inherent risk of command injection if the extraction logic fails to sanitize special characters within the PDF text.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizesWebSearchand thescholarlyCLI to fetch data from external academic databases, including OpenAlex, Semantic Scholar, Scopus, and Web of Science. These are well-known services required for the metadata enrichment functionality of the skill.
Audit Metadata