compile-knowledge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes uncontrolled project data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads from
docs/literature-review/,meeting-notes/,log/,MEMORY.md, source code, and.context/project-recap.md(SKILL.md, Phase 1). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing these raw inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
Write,Edit, andBash(mkdir*)capabilities, allowing it to modify project files and a global vault based on processed data (SKILL.md, Phase 3 & 5). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of input data before it is synthesized into new markdown articles.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a centralized vault directory outside the immediate project workspace.
- Sensitive file paths: The skill reads and writes to
~/vault/atlas/to sync project metadata (SKILL.md, Phase 5). While this is a documented feature for the 'Atlas' ecosystem, it involves cross-directory access to potentially sensitive user data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell tools but within a restricted scope.
- Restricted tools: The
Bashtool is constrained tomkdir*operations, which limits the risk of arbitrary command execution or shell-based privilege escalation (SKILL.md, Frontmatter).
Audit Metadata