docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes several external system commands via the
subprocessmodule to handle document processing. Inscripts/office/soffice.py, it executesgccto compile a compatibility shim. Inscripts/office/validators/redlining.py, it usesgit difffor comparing document text. It also launchessoffice(LibreOffice) andpdftoppmfor conversion tasks. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code generation and process injection in
scripts/office/soffice.py. The script writes an embedded C source string to a temporary file, compiles it into a shared library usinggcc, and then injects this library into thesofficeprocess using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. While intended to facilitate Unix socket communication in restricted environments, this runtime compilation and injection pattern is a high-risk behavior. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted external data from document files.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/office/unpack.pyextracts raw XML and text content from user-provided.docxfiles and places it in the agent's context. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to ensure the agent ignores instructions found within the document data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful bash tools and file-writing capabilities, which could be abused if it follows instructions embedded in a document.
- Sanitization: While the scripts use
defusedxmlto prevent XML-level exploits, they do not sanitize or filter the extracted document text for AI-targeted instructions.
Audit Metadata