skill-extract
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the session history to generate persistent skill definitions in
SKILL.mdfor future sessions.\n - Ingestion points: The agent's session context and user-provided instructions are used to construct the logic and descriptions of new skill files in
SKILL.md.\n - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the
Write,Edit, andBash(uv run python*)tools, enabling it to create, modify, and execute scripts or instructions based on the extracted content.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly mandate the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when interpolating extracted session content into the new skill's prompt body.\n
- Sanitization: While a validation script (
scripts/validate_skill.py) is provided, it focuses on structural integrity (YAML frontmatter, naming conventions, and regex checks) and does not sanitize the generated prompt content for potential malicious fragments that could influence future sessions.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to manage the lifecycle of newly created skills.\n - Evidence: Phase 5 in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to executeuv run pythonto run the included validation script (scripts/validate_skill.py) against the new skill directory.\n - Evidence: Phase 6 in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to usecp -rto deploy the new skill directory to the final skills root path.
Audit Metadata