canary
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs direct shell command interpolation of several variables derived from external or user-provided input without sanitization.
- Evidence: In Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 4, the variables
${URL},${BASE_URL}, and${PAGE_PATH}are used insidecurlcommands and shell loops (e.g.,curl -sf "${URL}/health"). - If these variables contain shell metacharacters like semicolons, backticks, or subshell expansions, they will be executed by the shell environment processing the instructions.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a significant attack surface where untrusted data from the web influences executable shell blocks.
- Ingestion points: In Phase 3, the skill fetches and parses
sitemap.xmlandrobots.txtfrom the target URL to discover pages to monitor. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded malicious content in the parsed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
curl,git,mkdir, and general shell execution. - Sanitization: The paths extracted via
grepfrom sitemaps are added to the${PAGES[@]}array and executed in a loop in Phase 4 without any escaping or validation. A malicious site could serve a sitemap containing a path like"; touch /tmp/pwned; #"to trigger execution. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses local project metadata and configuration files to identify the deployment environment.
- Evidence: It reads
fly.toml,render.yaml,vercel.json,netlify.toml,Procfile, andrailway.tomlto detect the platform. - Evidence: It executes
git logandgit branchto capture deployment context. These operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose of post-deploy monitoring.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata