eval-hooks
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The discovery script in Step 2 uses
echo "$command"to process hook strings retrieved from settings files. If a malicious.claude/settings.jsonfile contains shell metacharacters or subshell expressions (e.g.,$(...)) in the command field, they may be executed by the agent during the discovery phase before user confirmation occurs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill targets and reads sensitive configuration files from the user's home directory (
~/.claude/), includingsettings.jsonandsettings.local.json. These files contain private configuration and potentially credentials for the agent environment, exposing them to the agent context. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from project-level configuration files that may be controlled by external actors.
- Ingestion points:
.claude/settings.jsonand.claude/settings.local.jsonin project directories. - Boundary markers: Interactive review step (Step 5) is present, but discovery (Step 2) lacks markers to prevent instruction following during the audit process.
- Capability inventory: Read, Glob, Bash, Edit.
- Sanitization: Absent in initial command resolution; interactive confirmation is used for modifications but not for discovery script execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata