handoff-create

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the $ARGUMENTS[0] variable to define the destination path for the handoff document without providing instructions for path validation or sanitization. This allows a user to provide a path containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../.ssh/authorized_keys) which could result in overwriting sensitive system or configuration files.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by persisting untrusted session data into instructions for future agents. 1. Ingestion points: The skill reads the entire current conversation history (SKILL.md). 2. Boundary markers: The instructions do not require the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for data processed from the session history. 3. Capability inventory: The skill performs file-write operations to the local filesystem (SKILL.md). 4. Sanitization: There are no requirements to escape or filter content before writing it to the handoff document, allowing malicious commands within the session to be propagated to subsequent agents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 17, 2026, 07:37 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — handoff-create