plan-pipeline-start
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from PRD files, design documents, and project architecture notes to influence the planning process and agent orchestration.
- Ingestion points: PRD files,
docs/INFORMATION_ARCHITECTURE.md, and existing ADR files. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded commands within these external documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Task toolto spawn background agents, writes implementation plans and Architectural Decision Records (ADRs) to the filesystem, and performs git commits. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation for the data ingested from external project files before it is used to generate research tasks or plan structures.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the
Task toolto dynamically spawn sub-agents for codebase research and technical analysis. While this is an intended feature for orchestration, the instructions for these background tasks are derived from untrusted external input (Phase 1/2), creating a vector for influencing system behavior through malicious documentation content.
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