gitops-repo-audit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted Kubernetes manifests, ConfigMaps, and Secrets from user-provided repositories. This activity creates an ingestion point for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious content in the repository could influence the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads resource inventories, ConfigMap data for environment variables, and Kustomization post-build substitution literals (documented in SKILL.md Phases 1, 2, and 4).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when the agent ingests content from the repository files.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell scripts that invoke
flux,flux-schema, andhelmcommands, and the agent is instructed to grep through generated manifest bundles. - Sanitization: The skill relies on the validation tools to process manifest content and does not implement separate sanitization of the values before the agent reviews them.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a suite of local shell scripts (
scripts/discover.sh,scripts/validate.sh,scripts/check-deprecated.sh) which interact with the filesystem and invoke external binaries likefluxandhelm. While this is the intended primary purpose of the skill, it represents a powerful capability that operates on the user's local environment. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates rendered Kubernetes manifests at runtime by executing
kustomize build(viaflux-schema) andhelm template. It also instructs the agent to dynamically create.envfiles from repository data to facilitate variable substitution during validation. These generation and execution patterns are typical for auditing tools but involve runtime assembly of executable configuration.
Audit Metadata