write-testrail-cases
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to silently read sensitive authentication tokens from the local file system to authenticate with external services.
- Sensitive file paths:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to attempt reading credentials from~/.folio-credentialsand.envin the repository root. - Network operations: The retrieved credentials (
TESTRAIL_API_KEY,JIRA_API_TOKEN,GITHUB_TOKEN) are utilized in network requests tofoliotest.testrail.io, Jira, and GitHub APIs. - Concealment: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to try the credential sources "silently" and avoid prompting the user.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external Jira tickets which is then used as input for generating test cases.
- Ingestion points: User stories and Jira ticket data (Summary, Description, AC) are fetched via the Jira MCP tool as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are specified to separate external content from the model's logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent has extensive network capabilities (API access to TestRail, Jira, and GitHub) and file-read access to its reference directory.
- Sanitization: There is no mentioned validation or filtering of the external data before processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches project-specific metadata and translation files from remote repositories.
- Details: It constructed URLs to download
en_US.jsonandpackage.jsonfiles from thefolio-orgorganization on GitHub to enrich the test case context.
Audit Metadata