mcp-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The evaluation harness in
scripts/evaluation.pyis vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes external, potentially untrusted data that is then interpreted by an LLM.\n - Ingestion points: The script reads test questions from an XML file (
eval_file) and processes outputs from tools provided by the MCP server being tested.\n - Boundary markers (absent): While the system prompt uses XML-style tags for the agent's own responses, it does not include explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore or treat test questions and tool outputs as untrusted data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute local commands (via
scripts/connections.pyusingstdio_client) and perform network operations (viasse_clientorstreamablehttp_clientinscripts/connections.py).\n - Sanitization (absent): There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the questions or tool outputs before they are interpolated into the prompt for the LLM.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/evaluation.pyscript uses thecreate_connectionfactory inscripts/connections.pyto execute local shell commands. This functionality is used to launch MCP servers under test using thestdiotransport. While this is an intended feature of the tool, it represents a powerful capability that executes user-supplied arguments.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation (SKILL.md) instructs the agent to fetch external resources usingWebFetch. Specifically, it points to official MCP sitemaps and SDK documentation on GitHub (modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdkandmodelcontextprotocol/python-sdk). These are recognized as well-known and trusted sources for the protocol being implemented.
Audit Metadata