notebooklm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/__init__.py,scripts/setup_environment.py, andscripts/run.pyto automate environment setup, install Python dependencies, and wrap the execution of its own scripts. These calls are used for local management and do not use shell=True. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads Python packages from PyPI and installs Google Chrome via the
patchrightlibrary during its first-run setup to enable browser automation. These are standard operations for this type of tool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data directly from Google NotebookLM's user interface, which could contain instructions from uploaded documents or the underlying Gemini model.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/ask_question.pyandscripts/browser_session.pyretrieve text content from the NotebookLM response area. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a follow-up reminder but does not provide explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore commands within the retrieved text.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the local filesystem, network operations, and can execute the skill's Python scripts via a provided wrapper.
- Sanitization: The ingested text is extracted from the DOM without explicit sanitization or filtering.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Authentication cookies and browser profile data are stored locally in the
data/directory to allow persistent sessions. The skill documentation explicitly warns that this data is sensitive and should not be shared.
Audit Metadata