solo-grill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied "plans, designs, or decisions" to formulate its interview questions. This ingestion of untrusted data creates a surface for instructions embedded within the user's plan to potentially influence the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: User input provided via the argument hint "<the plan, design, or decision to grill>" in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) or system instructions to ignore embedded commands within the user's plan.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to use
Bash,Read,Grep,Glob, andWebSearchto verify facts and explore the environment. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions to escape or validate the interpolated user content before the agent processes it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to "explore the environment — filesystem, git history, the codebase, the web" using its toolset to settle facts. While this is a core feature of the skill, the combination of direct system access via
Bashand the processing of external plans increases the potential impact of an injection attack.
Audit Metadata