fit-basecamp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages the execution of the
claudeCLI and its own background scheduler daemon. - Uses
posix_spawnto launch agents with specific prompts. - Provides commands (
--daemon,--wake,--stop) to control child process execution and monitoring. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and utilizes resources associated with its author.
- Built around the
@forwardimpact/basecamppackage. - Downloads and merges knowledge base templates and agent skills via the
--updatecommand. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local data to populate the agent's knowledge base.
- Reads Apple Mail threads and Calendar events from
~/.cache/fit/basecamp/. - Accesses local configuration and state files in
~/.fit/basecamp/. - This data is used locally to provide context to agents as part of the core functionality.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via the data it processes.
- Ingestion points: Content is ingested from external email threads and calendar events (found in
~/.cache/fit/basecamp/). - Boundary markers: None identified for isolating untrusted mail/calendar content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the
claudeCLI usingposix_spawn. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested email/calendar data before it is interpolated into agent prompts.
Audit Metadata