fit-basecamp

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages the execution of the claude CLI and its own background scheduler daemon.
  • Uses posix_spawn to launch agents with specific prompts.
  • Provides commands (--daemon, --wake, --stop) to control child process execution and monitoring.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and utilizes resources associated with its author.
  • Built around the @forwardimpact/basecamp package.
  • Downloads and merges knowledge base templates and agent skills via the --update command.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local data to populate the agent's knowledge base.
  • Reads Apple Mail threads and Calendar events from ~/.cache/fit/basecamp/.
  • Accesses local configuration and state files in ~/.fit/basecamp/.
  • This data is used locally to provide context to agents as part of the core functionality.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via the data it processes.
  • Ingestion points: Content is ingested from external email threads and calendar events (found in ~/.cache/fit/basecamp/).
  • Boundary markers: None identified for isolating untrusted mail/calendar content from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the claude CLI using posix_spawn.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested email/calendar data before it is interpolated into agent prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 28, 2026, 03:33 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — fit-basecamp