openspec-implementation-cn

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon instructions found in external files like proposal.md and tasks.json. This architecture presents a significant surface for indirect prompt injection, as an attacker who can modify these files could direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Ingestion points: Files located at spec/changes/{change-id}/proposal.md and spec/changes/{change-id}/tasks.json. Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or warnings to treat the file content as untrusted data. Capability inventory: The agent is empowered to modify code, run shell commands (npm, pytest, curl), and use remote access tools (ssh). Sanitization: The skill lacks instructions for the agent to sanitize or validate the external file content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Reference materials provided in the skill include high-risk shell commands with a hardcoded IP address and root user access (ssh root@167.71.39.50). Instructing an agent to perform remote administrative access to a specific external IP address is a dangerous pattern that could lead to unauthorized access or exposure of infrastructure.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill's documented deployment and maintenance workflows explicitly reference the use of the root administrative account on remote systems, which involves operating with elevated privileges.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 06:04 PM