marketing-loops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from multiple external sources.
- Ingestion points: The
newsjacking,social-listening,community-engagement,voice-of-customer, andbrand-mentionloops ingest content from news sites (HN/Reddit/X), social media platforms, community forums (Slack/Discord), and customer feedback tools (surveys, tickets, reviews). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit requirements for using delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating external content into prompts.
- Capability inventory: The loops orchestrate skills like
emails,social,public-relations, andads, which are capable of network operations (sending/publishing) and file modifications. - Sanitization: While the
loop-guardrails.mdmandates PII hashing, it does not specify sanitization or escaping techniques to neutralize malicious instructions embedded in the external data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the creation and scheduling of recurring tasks (loops), which involves dynamic logic generation.
- The
references/loop-template.mdandSKILL.mdprovide a framework for the agent to author new 'loops' (repeatable workflows). These are then scheduled for execution using platform-specific primitives (e.g.,CronCreate,ScheduleWakeupin Claude Code). - Generating and scheduling logic from templates constitutes a form of dynamic execution, although it is constrained to the intended marketing domain.
Audit Metadata