create-prd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow involves reading existing documents from the project environment to automatically extract context for new PRDs. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in those documents could potentially influence the agent's actions during the extraction and generation phases.
- Ingestion points: The skill searches for and reads files in
docs/orprd/directories, as well as any user-specified files (SKILL.md, Phase 0). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions found within these ingested files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local system and execute the
lark-clitool to interact with cloud documents (SKILL.md, Phase 4). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the content extracted from external files before it is used in the prompt context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
lark-clicommand-line interface to perform its primary function of uploading documents to Feishu. This involves interpolating generated content into shell commands (SKILL.md, Phase 4).
Audit Metadata