antigravity-skill-orchestrator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a remote 'Master Skill Catalog' from a third-party GitHub repository not associated with a trusted organization or the designated skill author. This content is used to discover and bring other skills into the execution context.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions to fetch the catalog fromhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/main/CATALOG.mdif local capabilities are insufficient. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests remote, unverified text that directly guides the agent's task-solving strategy.
- Ingestion points: Step 3.3 in
SKILL.md(Discover and Select Skills) involves fetching and scanning the externalCATALOG.mdfile. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters for the external content or warn the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions inside the catalog.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to search, read, and execute other specialized tools/skills (like
@agent-memory-mcp) based on the catalog's content. - Sanitization: Absent. No validation or filtering is applied to the catalog content before the agent uses it for skill selection.
Audit Metadata